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Economic models that attempt to identify a reaction func-
tion for the monetary authority focus on central bank activities
in developed countries. Those in developing countries, in
contrast, do not get the same attention, owing to the belief that
central banks in these countries were created with the primary
objective of financing the government deficit. There has been,
however, a growing surge of interest in analyzing monetary* The views expressed here in are those of the author and should not be
attributed to the IMF, its executive board or its management.
* Tel.: þ1 202 623 4558.
E-mail address: mkandil@imf.org.
Peer review under responsibility of Borsa _Istanbul Anonim Şirketi
Production and hosting by Elsevier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2014.04.001
2214-8450/Copyright  2014, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim Şirketi. Production and hospolicy in developing countries.1 In these studies, investigators
have differentiated between the type of policies: accommo-
dative and stabilizing. An accommodative policy is defined to
be a policy that provides a regular supply of credit for an
expanding economy. A stabilizing policy, in contrast, is a
policy that is used to dampen, or offset, undesired changes
affecting the economy. In the first accommodative scenario,
monetary growth accommodates output growth and price
inflation. In the second stabilizing scenario, the monetary
authority varies monetary growth in order to counter the1 Recent research has considered several dimensions that could impact on the
effectiveness of monetary policy, e.g., uncertainty and labor market frictions
(Kilponen & Leitemo, 2008; Sala, 2008); asset substitution (Jones, 2008); inter-
national policy coordination (Chapman, 2008; Sahuc & Smets, 2008); exchange
rate pressure (Kumah, 2007); Islamicmanagement (Wilson, 2008); fiscal crises and
globalization (Sentance, 2008); central bank profitability (Buiter, 2008); monetary
union (Kamar & Naceur, 2007); influencing private sector (Weise, 2008); tradeoffs
(Graham & Snower, 2008); rules versus discretion (Doyle & Falk, 2008).
ting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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etary policy.
Many central banks in developing countries lack indepen-
dence in their operations. Hence, the objectives of monetary
policymay not be clearly defined.2 The stabilizing functionmay
be targeting output growth. Accordingly, the central bank in-
creases liquidity in order to increase credit expansion and
stimulate the economy during periods of a slowdown. In an
extreme scenario, the government may be pursuing a leading
role in structural, economic, and social development. Hence, the
Central Bank may be obliged to provide credit to finance the
increased government spending. A problem arises, however, if
the increased government spending, by limiting available credit,
crowds out private spending.3 Additionally, the increased
spending may not be appropriately geared towards expanding
productive capacity. Hence, higher government spending may
prove inflationary. Financing the increased government
spending via monetization depletes the stock of foreign reserves
in a small open economy. As a result, devaluation of the do-
mestic economy may prove necessary, increasing the risk of a
vicious cycle of depreciation and inflation.
Given concerns about accommodating higher government
spending, central banks may resort to establishing nominal
anchors that guide the design of monetary policy. In a small
open economy, priorities may be established to defend an
exchange rate peg. Hence, the independence of monetary
policy is severely undermined, since fluctuations in the interest
rate may contradict the target for the exchange rate and the
supporting level of foreign reserves.
Some developing countries may decide, however, that
pegging the exchange rate is not the optimal anchor for mon-
etary policy if they suffer from high inflation. Hence, targeting
inflation may provide a better nominal anchor for the design of
monetary policy. Accordingly, the monetary authority estab-
lishes a variety of indicators that drive the inflation process. The
money supply responds to changes in these indicators in order
to keep inflation under control. This scenario deprives the
monetary authority of a good deal of independence.
Under a scenario that involves a higher degree of inde-
pendence, the Central Bank may follow a more discretionary2 Some have claimed that lags, rigidities, and the disequilibrium analysis are
the essence of short-term LDCs macro understanding (for example, Behrman,
1981; Crockett, 1981). Others have focused on more elaborate analysis of
structural differences between developing and developed countries. See Porter
and Ranney (1982) for a summary of the theoretical literature. For more
detailed references, see Behrman and Hanson (1979), Cline and Weintraub
(1981), and Bruno (1979). For some empirical evidence on the success of
macroeconomic policies in developing and developed countries, see Kandil
(1991).
3 For more details, see Bean and Buiter (1987). Some studies have
considered the evidence of specific factors that determine crowding out in the
face of government spending. First is the impact of government spending on
the interest rate (see, e.g., Evans, 1987). A second strand of the literature
considered the sensitivity of investment demand to the change in the interest
rate (see, e.g., Chirinko, 1993).approach. Hence, priorities may be established, and not
necessarily announced, in reaction to economic development.
The design of monetary policy may be targeting the stability
of the exchange rate, the price level, or output growth.
Regardless of the objectives established for monetary pol-
icy, the ultimate result of fluctuations in the money supply will
be absorbed in output growth and price inflation. The trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy to the real economy is
through aggregate demand. The size of the aggregate demand
shift is dependent on the liquidity effect attributed to a change
in the money supply and the sensitivity of the aggregate de-
mand to the change in liquidity. Crowding out may arise,
however, if inflationary expectations develop and/or capital
outflow increases.
Assuming that monetary policy is effective in stimulating
demand growth, the allocation of the change in demand be-
tween output growth and price inflation is dependent on
constraints on the supply side of the economy. Capacity
constraints are bound to accelerate price inflation. Nonethe-
less, wage and/or price rigidity may reinforce the real effect
and moderate the nominal effects of fluctuations in the money
supply.
Realizing the complexity surrounding the effectiveness of
monetary policy, the present investigation will shed some light
on the results of variation in monetary growth in developing
countries. The data under investigation are annual for a large
sample of developing countries. The time-series evidence will
indicate the effects of expansionary and contractionary mon-
etary shocks on real output growth and price inflation within
countries.
Cross-country regressions will evaluate constraints that
determine the allocation of monetary shocks between output
growth and price inflation across countries: supply constraints,
the elasticity of aggregate demand, and the variability of mon-
etary shocks. Underlying these factors are structural constraints
on the demand and supply sides of the specific economy.
Additionally, the analysis will demonstrate the effects of mon-
etary shocks on key determinants of macroeconomic perfor-
mance across countries.
To anticipate the results, both demand and supply con-
straints differentiate the impact of monetary policy on real
growth across countries. The response of real growth increases
the more elastic aggregate demand to the change in monetary
growth. Moreover, supply-side constraints decrease the output
response and increase price inflation in the face of monetary
shocks. Economic performance is dependent on monetary
variability. Across countries, trend output growth increases the
higher the response of real growth to monetary shocks.
Consistent with the stabilizing function of monetary policy,
output variability decreases the higher the response of real
growth to monetary shocks. In contrast, the variability of
monetary shocks increases both the trend and variability of
price inflation across countries. This evidence indicates the
importance of monetary policy in determining economic per-
formance in developing countries. Addressing structural con-
straints and increasing policy credibility are key determinants
of the effectiveness of monetary policy.
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An increase in the money supply increases the supply of
credit.4 To bring the money market back to equilibrium, a
reduction in the interest rate is necessary to stimulate money
demand.5 In the goods market, aggregate spending increases in
response to a reduction in the interest rate. Higher income
stimulates money demand, moderating the necessary reduction
in the interest rate. The effectiveness of monetary policy to
stimulate aggregate demand is dependent, therefore, on three
factors: (i) the elasticity of money demand with respect to a
change in income, (ii) the elasticity of money demand with
respect to a change in the interest rate, and (iii) the elasticity of
aggregate spending with respect to a change in the interest
rate.
The effectiveness of monetary policy decreases with the
increase in the response of money demand to income.
Following an increase in the money supply, higher response of
money demand to an increase in income closes the disequi-
librium gap and decreases the necessary reduction in the in-
terest rate. The effectiveness of monetary policy increases the
less responsive money demand to a change in the interest rate.
Hence, a large reduction of the interest rate is necessary in the
face of an increase in the money supply. The effectiveness of
monetary policy also increases the higher the sensitivity of
aggregate demand to a change in the interest rate. Accord-
ingly, the size of aggregate demand shifts is maximized in the
face of monetary shocks.
The above scenario is valid in a closed economy. In an open
economy, fluctuations in the interest rate may affect capital
mobility. A reduction in the interest rate induces capital
outflow and reduces inflows. Subsequent reduction in reserves
decreases the monetary base, mitigating the expansionary ef-
fect of monetary policy.6 Fluctuations in the exchange rate
may also be relevant in this context. Assuming a flexible ex-
change rate, an increase in net capital outflow causes a
depreciation of the exchange rate, which increases trade
competitiveness. The resulting expansion in net exports re-
inforces the expansionary effect of monetary policy.
Conditions on the supply side of the economy are also
relevant to the effects of monetary policy.7 The more flexible
are wages and prices, the larger is the inflationary effect of
monetary policy and the smaller is output expansion. Capacity
constraints may also limit the output response to monetary4 See, e.g., Friedman (1968), Cagan (1972), Mishkin (1981), Tanzi (1984),
and Mishkin (1988).
5 Research on the liquidity effect of monetary growth includes Coleman,
Gilles, and La badie (1992), Leeper and Gordon (1992), Fama (1990),
Mishkin (1992), Wallace and Warner (1993), and Soderlind (1999).
6 A reduction in international reserves prompts the monetary authority to
slow down the growth of domestic credit in order to raise the domestic interest
rate and attract foreign funds.
7 Some models, see, e.g., Lane and Perotti (1996), have focused on labor
market conditions in judging supply-side constraints.expansion, necessitating a faster adjustment of price inflation.
The faster increase in price reduces real money balances and
raises the interest rate, offsetting the positive effect of mone-
tary policy on aggregate demand. The magnitude of the price
increase determines the crowding out effect attributed to
conditions in the product market.
Other factors may further complicate the analysis con-
cerning the effectiveness of monetary policy. The objectives of
monetary policy are also of some relevance. If monetary
growth accommodates an increase in the government budget
deficit, the Central Bank may deplete its limited stock of
foreign reserves to finance higher government spending.
Additionally, inflationary expectations are likely to develop,
decreasing demand for money and accelerating price inflation.
As confidence is shaken in the stability of the exchange rate,
depreciation (devaluation) is bound to occur, which may
further stimulate inflationary expectation and counter the
effectiveness of monetary policy.8
Given channels of interaction in the macroeconomy, a study
of the effectiveness of monetary policy requires an evaluation
of parameters that measure flexibility and identify constraints
on the demand and supply sides of the economy.
The framework of this investigation is an empirical study of
the effects of the growth of the money supply on real output
growth and price inflation in a sample of developing countries.
To shed some light on determinants of variation across
countries, the empirical estimation measures the elasticity of
aggregate demand in the face of monetary shocks. To
approximate supply-side constraints, the investigation will
estimate the speed of price adjustment in the face of aggregate
demand shocks.
3. Empirical framework
The empirical model comprises reduced form equations of
output and price. The growth component of the series is the
domain of real growth factors that vary with labor, capital, and
technology. Test results indicate that this component is non-
stationary.9 To account for non-stationarity, empirical models
of real output and price are estimated in first-differenced form.
Fluctuations in real output and price are attributed to a variety
of shocks impinging on the economic system.
Assume aggregate demand shocks are distributed sym-
metrically around an anticipated steady-state trend over time.
This trend is consistent with capacity utilization in the econ-
omy. Shocks to aggregate demand are allocated between
output growth and price inflation.8 For a discussion, see, e.g., Caballero and Pyndick (1996). In an open
economy, uncertainty decreases foreign direct investment and encourages
capital outflow.
9 Test results, following the suggestions of Nelson and Plosser (1982), verify
the empirical validity of this hypothesis. Based on tabulation provided by
Dickey and Fuller (1981), real output and price are non-stationary in level and
stationary in first-difference.
10 For a detailed theoretical illustration, see Kandil and Mirzaie (2002).
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mestic and foreign demand. On the domestic front, policy
variables include government spending and the money supply.
To account for interaction with the rest of the world through
the current and financial accounts, the model specification also
includes the exchange rate.
Assume shocks to the money supply are distributed
randomly around a steady state moving trend over time. This
trend varies with movements in the underlying fundamentals
that determine the growth of the money supply over time.
Fluctuations around this trend are symmetrically distributed.
Fluctuations in the face of monetary shocks are likely to be
determined by supply and demand constraints. On the supply
side, capacity constraints determine price flexibility in the face
of aggregate demand shifts. More binding constraints imply a
steeper aggregate supply curve and higher price flexibility. On
the demand side, structural parameters determine the size of
aggregate demand shifts in the face of monetary shocks. Less
crowding out implies larger demand shifts in the face of mone-
tary shocks.
As the transmission channel of random shocks, including
monetary shocks, could vary during expansions and contrac-
tions, shocks are separated into positive and negative com-
ponents to test possible asymmetry in the empirical models.
Accordingly, the empirical models are specified as follows:
Dpt ¼ a0þ a1Et1dt þ a2Et1ht þ a3ppost þ a3nnegt
þ a4pposht þ a4nneght þ h1t ð1Þ
Ddst ¼ g0þ g1pposgt þ g1nneggt þ g2pposmt þ g2nnegmt
þ g3pposht þ g3nneght þ h2t ð2Þ
The empirical model in (1) approximates price flexibility in
the face of aggregate demand shocks. D(.) is the first-
difference operator. E(.) is the expected value of a given var-
iable at time t based on information available to agents at time
t  1. Aggregate price inflation is denoted by Dpt. Edt denotes
anticipated growth in aggregate demand. The empirical model
in (2) approximates the size of unanticipated aggregate de-
mand shifts where Ddst approximates the size of unanticipated
shifts in the face of a variety of shocks. The exchange rate
measures the domestic currency price of foreign currency. An
increase indicates currency depreciation. Anticipated depre-
ciation of the exchange rate is denoted by Eht. Positive and
negative shocks to aggregate demand are denoted by post and
negt. Positive shocks to the exchange rate, posh, approximate
unexpected depreciation of the domestic currency. Similarly,
negh approximates unexpected appreciation of the domestic
currency. The residuals h1t, and h2t are random unexplained
residuals with zero mean and constant variance.
Price flexibility in the face of aggregate demand shocks, a3p
and a3n, is likely to be determined by conditions on the supply
side of the specific economy. Ifa3p is significantly larger thana3n,
the aggregate supply curve is steeper in the face of expansionary
aggregate demand shifts compared to contractionary shifts.
Aggregate demand fluctuations vary with expansionary and
contractionary government spending shocks, posgt and neggtwith magnitudes that equal g1p and g1n. The parameters g2p
and g2n approximate the size of unanticipated shifts of
aggregate demand in the face of expansionary and contrac-
tionary monetary shocks, posmt and negmt. Unanticipated
demand shifts in the face of currency depreciation and
appreciation are approximated by g3p and g3n.
In the next step of the empirical investigation, models are
estimated to measure the effects of fluctuations in the money
supply on output growth and price inflation. A positive shock to
the money supply increases credit availability. Through the
multiplier process, the effect is reinforced on aggregate demand.
Nonetheless, the possibility of crowding out may involve an
offsetting effect on private spending. Changes in the money
supply may be accommodating fluctuations in government
spending and/or the exchange rate. Hence, both shocks enter the
empirical models along with the change in the money supply.
Underlying the model specification is the assumption that
cyclical fluctuations in the output supplied is attributed to
changes in the output price around its anticipated value, i.e.,
output price surprises. Anticipated shifts in the aggregate
economy guide production plans and nominal adjustments in
steady state. In contrast, cyclical fluctuations are a function of
demand shocks that include shocks to government spending, the
money supply, and the exchange rate. In addition, fluctuations in
the exchange ratemay also determine cyclical fluctuations in the
output supplied. Given that many of the sample countries are
typically small and open economies with high dependency on
imported goods, a depreciation of the exchange rate increases
the cost of imported goods and decreases the output supplied.10
Substituting for aggregate demand shifts in (1) with specific
shifts underlying aggregate demand results in the reduced
form equations in (3) and (4). Real output growth and price
inflation are a function of anticipated and unanticipated shifts
in the exchange rate and specific policy variables underlying
aggregate demand, government spending, and the money
supply, as follows:
Dyt ¼ b0y þ b1yEt1gt þ b2yEt1mt þ b3yEt1ht þ b4ypposgt
þ b4ynneggt þ b5ypposmt þ b5ynnegmt þ b6ypposht
þ b6ynneght þ h3t
ð3Þ
Dpt ¼ b0pþ b1pEt1gt þ b2pEt1mt þ b3pEt1ht þ b4ppposgt
þ b4pnneggt þ b5ppposmt þ b5pnnegmt þ b6ppposht
þ b6pnneght þ h4t
ð4Þ
Real output growth is denoted by Dyt. Egt and Emt denote
anticipated growth of government spending and the money
supply. The residuals h3t, and h4t are random unexplained
residuals with zero mean and constant variance.
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pected to increase the cost of the output supplied. Hence, output
growth decreases, b3y< 0, and price inflation increases, b3p> 0.
Anticipated growth in government spending and the money
supply increases the demand for goods. Producers are expected
to adjust price inflation to copewith anticipated demand growth,
b1p, b2p > 0. Nonetheless, institutional rigidity may prevent
prices from adjusting fully to anticipated demand growth,
necessitating an increase in output growth, b1y, b2y > 0.
Unanticipated changes in the domestic currency affect both
the demand and supply sides of the economy. Unanticipated
depreciation of the domestic currency increases demand for
exports and decreases domestic demand for imports. This
channel increases real output growth and price inflation. Also
on the demand side, unanticipated depreciation of the do-
mestic currency is likely to increase money demand,
decreasing velocity and, hence, domestic demand. This
channel is likely to moderate the increase in real output growth
and price inflation. On the supply side, unanticipated currency
depreciation increases the cost of the output produced,
decreasing output growth and raising price inflation. Hence,
the net effect on output growth and price inflation, b6yp, b6pp,
is dependent on structural parameters underlying the demand
and supply channels. Of course, the opposite holds in the face
of negative shocks to the exchange rate, i.e., unanticipated
currency appreciation, as measured by b6yn, b6pn in (3) and (4).
Expansionary government spending shocks are expected to
increase aggregate demand. Crowding out channels may
moderate or offset the effects of government spending shocks
on aggregate demand. If the net result is positive, expan-
sionary government spending shocks increase price inflation
and output growth, b4yp, b4pp > 0. The opposite holds for
contractionary government spending shocks, as measured by
b4yn, b4pn in (3) and (4).
Expansionary monetary shocks increase liquidity and, in
turn, available credit. Subsequently, aggregate demand is likely
to increase. Both output growth and price inflation respond
positively to the increase in demand, b5yp, b5yn, b5pp, b5pn > 0.
The effectiveness of monetary policy may be hampered, how-
ever, by accompanying domestic and external effects. Asym-
metry ismeasured by the difference betweenb5yp andb5yn. If this
difference is positive, the variability of monetary shocks in-
creases real output growth, on average, over time. Similarly, if
the difference betweenb5pp andb5pn is positive, the variability of
monetary shocks increases price inflation, on average, over time.
4. Time-series evidence
The data under investigation are annual for a sample of 105
developing countries, data permitting.11 The sample is diversi-
fied in many respects, including oil-producing Gulf countries11 Quarterly data are not available for a long time span for many of the
countries under investigation.such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E., former Eastern
Bloc countries, middle income countries like Argentina,
Indonesia, and Mexico, and low income countries. The sample
period for investigation extends from 1968 to 2008, including
events such as Great inflation and the end of the Cold War to
examine the effects of monetary policy shocks across different
countries under different conditions. Description of variables
and data sources are provided in Appendix B.12 The empirical
models (1) and (2), or (3) and (4) are estimated jointly with the
equations that determine agents’ forecasts of variables that enter
the empirical model (see Appendix A for details). As described
in the Appendix, the basic model consists of AD and AS
equations and the model is closed with the equations for the
monetary policy authority (some sort of Taylor rule), the fiscal
policy rule and the exchange rate model.
The results of estimating the empirical models (3) and (4)
are presented in Table 1. The time-series results highlight
the effects of various factors in the empirical model on real
output growth and price inflation.13 In the interest of space
limitation, the analysis evaluates the parameters measuring the
effects of monetary policy.
Anticipated monetary growth is expected to increase output
growth and price inflation. A statistically significant increase
in output growth is evident in sixteen countries. Nonetheless,
there is evidence of a significant reduction in real output
growth in the face of anticipated monetary growth. As indi-
cated above, anticipated monetary growth increases inflation-
ary expectations, which may adversely affect real growth. A
statistically significant increase in price inflation with respect
to higher anticipated monetary growth is evident in forty
countries. Price inflation responds negatively and significantly
to anticipated monetary growth in five countries, indicating
structural constraints that block the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy to aggregate demand.
Expansionary monetary shocks increase real output growth
significantly in eight countries and increase price inflation
significantly in twenty-one countries. Contractionary mone-
tary shocks decrease real output growth significantly in sixteen
countries and decrease price inflation significantly in twenty-
four countries. Clearly, the elasticity of aggregate demand to
contractionary monetary shocks appears larger, compared to
that with respect to expansionary shocks. Moreover, capacity
constraints hinder output expansion and increase price infla-
tion with respect to expansionary shocks, compared to
contractionary shocks.
The parameters from the time-series models are further
evaluated in the context of cross-section analysis that seeks to
summarize the evidence and draw the relevant implications.12 For a few countries, the exchange rate was fixed over the sample period.
Hence, the model is estimated without the exchange rate variable.
13 Estimates of the empirical models in (1) and (2) are available upon request.
The parameters measuring price flexibility along the aggregate supply curve
and the size of demand shifts in the face of monetary shocks are included in
the cross-country regressions of the next section.
Table 1
The real and inflationary effects of policy shocks.
Country Var Constant EDh EDg EDm Posh Negh Posg Negg Posm Negm R Squared
Albania Dy 0.071* (2.26) 0.28* (3.19) 0.35 (1.56) 0.048 (0.20) 0.071 (0.20) 0.63 (1.22) 0.42 (0.88) 1.32* (2.75) 1.023** (1.89) 0.016 (0.04) 0.75
Dp 0.004 (0.10) 0.069 (0.60) 0.74* (2.53) 0.45 (1.44) 0.22 (0.46) 0.19 (0.28) 0.28 (0.44) 1.47* (2.32) 1.43* (2.02) 0.36 (0.68) 0.95
Algeria Dy 0.022 (0.56) 0.14 (1.17) 0.15 (1.33) 0.29 (1.26) 0.24 (1.53) 0.007 (0.03) 0.37** (1.82) 0.30 (1.12) 0.23 (0.72) 0.026 (0.10) 0.37
Dp 0.15* (2.45) 0.042 (0.21) 0.82* (4.47) 0.84* (2.32) 0.83* (3.29) 0.16 (0.43) 0.75* (2.30) 1.50* (3.43) 0.092 (0.18) 0.32 (0.77) 0.78
Antigua and
Barbuda
Dy 0.027** (1.92) 0.035 (0.09) 0.099 (1.15) 0.048 (0.51) 0.80 (1.08) 0.86 (1.30) 0.58 (1.53) 0.063 (0.26) 0.41* (2.09) 0.11 (0.46) 0.42
Dp 0.0054 (0.25) 2.29* (3.67) 0.13 (1.02) 0.53* (3.74) 1.57 (1.39) 1.14 (1.14) 0.23 (0.40) 0.63** (1.69) 0.22 (0.73) 0.17 (0.45) 0.89
Argentina Dy 0.06* (3.72) 0.20* (3.67) 0.36* (2.83) 0.26* (2.11) 0.014 (0.35) 0.13* (3.12) 0.076 (0.92) 0.057 (0.77) 0.033 (0.50) 0.10 (1.27) 0.65
Dp 0.038 (0.81) 0.37* (2.29) 0.28 (0.74) 0.49 (1.37) 0.049 (0.42) 0.34* (2.77) 0.11 (0.47) 0.71* (3.30) 0.64* (3.28) 0.035 (0.15) 0.99
Bahrain Dy 0.02 (0.91) 0.99 (0.55) 0.29* (2.96) 0.009 (0.05) 4.07 (1.07) 2.17 (0.73) 0.50 (1.50) 0.21 (0.63) 0.22 (1.46) 0.055 (0.39) 0.39
Dp 0.028 (0.40) 0.93 (0.16) 0.24 (0.79) 0.055 (0.11) 14.21 (1.19) 0.12 (1.34) 0.47 (0.45) 0.13 (0.13) 0.064 (0.13) 0.60 (1.35) 0.86
Bangladesh Dy 0.039* (3.86) 0.037 (0.71) 0.0081 (0.46) 0.04 (1.00) 0.13 (0.37) 0.081 (0.28) 0.052 (1.08) 0.052 (1.04) 0.062 (0.69) 0.028 (0.38) 0.52
Dp 0.074 (1.44) 0.11 (0.43) 0.12 (1.32) 0.083 (0.41) 0.083 (0.04) 0.85 (0.59) 0.20 (0.80) 0.059 (0.23) 0.22 (0.48) 0.01 (0.03) 0.41
Barbados Dy 0.068** (1.87) 7.03* (3.00) 0.09 (0.69) 0.21 (0.62) 2.24 (0.38) 12.91* (3.28) 0.44 (1.49) 0.42 (1.08) 0.47** (1.73) 0.034 (0.15) 0.68
Dp 0.044 (0.82) 5.22 (1.50) 0.30 (1.58) 0.89** (1.75) 7.22 (0.82) 0.85 (0.15) 0.18 (0.40) 0.94 (1.62) 0.15 (0.37) 0.055 (0.17) 0.60
Belize Dy 0.056* (2.86) 0.018 (0.08) 0.031 (0.41) 0.26** (1.83) 0.33 (0.97) 0.19 (0.42) 0.06 (0.72) 0.11 (0.73) 0.0027 (0.02) 0.24 (1.12) 0.30
Dp 0.059 (0.92) 0.69 (0.92) 0.19 (0.79) 0.036 (0.08) 0.52 (0.47) 1.56 (1.07) 0.04 (0.15) 0.23 (0.48) 0.42 (0.73) 0.65 (0.93) 0.24
Benin Dy 0.035* (2.08) 0.072 (0.96) 0.0057 (0.31) 0.053 (0.67) 0.024 (0.32) 0.054 (0.56) 0.004 (0.06) 0.026 (0.31) 0.12 (1.48) 0.018 (0.70) 0.17
Dp 0.0052 (0.10) 0.13 (0.55) 0.035 (0.59) 0.20 (0.78) 0.071 (0.30) 0.23 (0.78) 0.30 (1.47) 0.15 (0.57) 0.35 (1.37) 0.006 (0.07) 0.28
Bolivia Dy 0.039* (4.30) 0.027 (0.70) 0.014 (0.50) 0.42 (1.23) 0.019 (0.61) 0.049 (1.08) 0.0093 (0.17) 0.0099 (0.74) 0.0022 (0.04) 0.031 (0.92) 0.70
Dp 0.019 (0.48) 0.69* (4.22) 0.24* (1.95) 0.032 (0.23) 0.62* (4.67) 0.94* (4.87) 0.46* (1.97) 0.03 (0.54) 0.064 (0.30) 0.038 (0.27) 0.99
Botswana Dy 0.053 (1.08) 0.17 (1.05) 0.11 (0.95) 0.17 (0.73) 0.10 (0.34) 0.059 (0.16) 0.39* (2.03) 0.15 (1.49) 0.27 (0.75) 0.08 (0.19) 0.42
Dp 0.11 (1.50) 0.081 (0.34) 0.15 (0.92) 0.10 (0.29) 0.088 (0.20) 0.26 (0.48) 0.065 (0.23) 0.05 (0.33) 0.085 (0.16) 0.34 (0.56) 0.41
Brazil Dy 0.066* (3.69) 0.0074 (0.61) 0.0045 (0.30) 0.0033 (0.70) 0.019 (0.14) 0.032 (0.29) 0.026 (0.84) 0.01 (0.50) 0.0021 (0.59) 0.0028 (0.28) 0.20
Dp 0.074 (0.76) 0.031 (0.47) 0.75* (9.02) 0.015 (0.19) 0.69 (0.92) 0.56 (0.95) 1.35* (7.90) 0.28* (2.60) 0.0037 (0.19) 0.043 (0.80) 0.95
Bulgaria Dy 0.12* (4.10) 0.006 (0.38) 0.079* (3.81) 0.16 (1.38) 0.29* (2.77) 0.28* (2.89) 0.30** (1.93) 0.23 (1.42) 0.20 (1.01) 0.033 (0.15) 0.67
Dp 0.14** (1.82) 0.036 (0.86) 1.064* (19.79) 0.11 (0.39) 0.69* (2.53) 0.23 (0.91) 1.32* (3.28) 0.92* (2.21) 0.57 (1.12) 0.0054 (0.01) 0.97
Burkina Faso Dy 0.035 (0.77) 0.087 (0.91) 0.34* (2.21) 0.099 (0.36) 0.23 (1.43) 0.21 (0.91) 0.049 (0.39) 0.16 (0.72) 0.20 (0.82) 0.21 (0.56) 0.041
Dp 0.065 (1.10) 0.079 (0.63) 0.31 (1.54) 0.62** (1.72) 0.26 (1.23) 0.20 (0.67) 0.60* (3.63) 0.18 (0.64) 0.079 (0.25) 0.31 (0.62) 0.74
Burundi Dy 0.035 (0.64) 0.31 (0.84) 0.011 (0.04) 0.08 (0.31) 0.042 (0.11) 0.18 (0.45) 0.26 (0.86) 0.22 (0.63) 0.0084 (0.06) 0.048 (0.31) 0.068
Dp 0.066 (1.15) 0.12 (0.31) 0.20 (0.61) 0.059 (0.21) 0.066 (0.16) 0.094 (0.22) 0.54 (1.66) 0.13 (0.36) 0.048 (0.34) 0.20 (1.18) 0.28
Cameroon Dy 0.052** (1.79) 0.36* (2.05) 0.027 (0.37) 0.30* (2.46) 0.0039 (0.03) 0.12 (0.60) 0.19 (1.44) 0.093 (1.03) 0.40** (1.87) 0.34* (2.41) 0.57
Dp 0.056** (1.83) 0.27 (1.44) 0.015 (0.20) 0.27* (2.12) 0.056 (0.45) 0.12 (0.58) 0.055 (0.40) 0.12 (1.28) 0.26 (1.15) 0.25 (1.66) 0.56
Cape Verdo Dy 0.06 (1.17) 0.03 (0.08) 0.0058 (0.04) 0.36 (0.91) 0.042 (0.08) 0.041 (0.10) 0.28 (1.18) 0.05 (0.15) 0.062 (0.13) 0.082 (0.14) 0.29
Dp 0.089* (3.04) 0.69* (3.22) 0.0031 (0.04) 0.20 (0.86) 0.047 (0.16) 0.12 (0.53) 0.056 (0.41) 0.029 (0.15) 0.23 (0.86) 0.51 (1.55) 0.74
Central African
Republic
Dy 0.024 (1.23) 0.20** (1.75) 0.014 (0.20) 0.077 (0.52) 0.23** (1.83) 0.25** (1.81) 0.28* (2.84) 0.043 (1.52) 0.0021 (0.02) 0.086 (0.59) 0.36
Dp 0.069* (2.09) 0.092 (0.48) 0.18 (1.59) 0.019 (0.08) 0.21 (1.00) 0.11 (0.49) 0.39* (2.29) 0.079 (1.66) 0.27 (1.20) 0.47** (1.88) 0.39
Chad Dy 0.012 (0.41) 0.36* (2.02) 0.22 (1.01) 0.11 (0.82) 0.27** (1.76) 0.20 (1.04) 0.052 (0.41) 0.60* (3.26) 0.25 (1.19) 0.13 (0.69) 0.50
Dp 0.012 (0.33) 1.074* (4.52) 0.12 (0.43) 0.081 (0.46) 0.26 (1.31) 0.22 (0.87) 0.067 (0.39) 0.14 (0.58) 0.25 (0.93) 0.28 (1.14) 0.75
Chile Dy 0.025 (1.23) 0.14* (3.17) 0.082* (2.42) 0.02 (0.43) 0.16* (2.65) 0.22* (2.22) 0.071 (0.97) 0.046 (1.49) 0.11 (0.78) 0.17 (0.18) 0.59
Dp 0.027 (0.78) 0.53* (7.19) 0.11** (1.93) 0.36* (4.45) 0.43* (4.28) 0.42* (2.47) 0.095 (0.75) 0.096** (1.81) 0.16 (0.65) 0.20 (1.18) 0.98
China, P.R.
Mainland
Dy 0.056** (1.77) 0.19 (1.29) 0.16 (1.07) 0.81* (4.03) 0.054 (0.66) 0.079 (0.52) 0.079 (0.43) 0.016 (0.07) 0.016 (0.10) 0.11 (0.60) 0.75
Dp 0.062 (1.42) 0.33 (1.66) 0.61* (3.04) 0.063 (0.23) 0.23* (2.02) 0.13 (0.60) 0.21 (0.82) 0.25 (0.79) 0.34 (1.45) 0.23 (0.94) 0.86
Colombia Dy 0.05** (1.85) 0.31* (2.53) 0.021 (1.20) 0.14 (1.04) 0.20 (1.19) 0.086 (0.55) 0.065 (1.41) 0.015 (1.05) 0.17 (1.37) 0.10 (0.89) 0.44
Dp 0.013 (0.17) 0.24 (0.71) 0.0012 (0.02) 0.61** (1.70) 0.47 (0.99) 0.42 (0.96) 0.0053 (0.04) 0.03 (0.77) 0.56 (1.65) 0.081 (0.26) 0.43
Comoros Dy 0.053* (2.35) 0.089 (0.70) 0.20 (1.65) 0.32* (2.93) 0.21* (2.20) 0.32* (2.06) 0.038 (0.12) 0.23 (0.59) 1.23* (2.25) 1.59* (2.69) 0.77
Dp 0.071* (2.24) 0.24 (1.34) 0.24 (1.44) 0.15 (0.98) 0.16 (1.18) 0.039 (0.17) 0.24 (0.52) 0.14 (0.26) 0.66 (0.85) 1.013 (1.21) 0.66
Congo,
Democratic
Republic of
Dy 0.038* (2.15) 0.071 (1.46) 0.10** (1.74) 0.022 (0.79) 0.054 (1.56) 0.016 (0.34) 0.036 (0.71) 0.056 (0.63) 0.0067 (0.18) 0.018 (0.51) 0.58
Dp 0.0066 (0.14) 0.76* (6.06) 0.096 (0.62) 0.075 (1.04) 0.72* (7.91) 0.48* (4.03) 0.56* (4.16) 0.19 (0.82) 0.16 (1.64) 0.23* (2.52) 0.99
Congo,
Republic of
Dy 0.039 (1.30) 0.35 (1.43) 0.19 (1.67) 0.25 (1.61) 0.25* (2.45) 0.17 (1.01) 0.10 (0.99) 0.0096 (0.21) 0.25 (1.54) 0.25 (1.65) 0.34
Dp 0.051 (1.44) 0.56** (1.80) 0.10 (0.75) 0.11 (0.60) 0.28* (2.34) 0.12 (0.61) 0.13 (1.07) 0.069 (1.27) 0.40* (2.05) 0.52* (2.86) 0.65
Costa Rica Dy 0.073* (3.61) 0.17* (2.48) 0.11 (1.38) 0.0085 (0.17) 0.0055 (0.14) 0.27* (2.96) 0.017 (0.11) 0.12 (0.76) 0.074 (1.01) 0.082 (1.00) 0.66
Dp 0.0056 (0.10) 0.65* (3.37) 0.67* (2.96) 0.0085 (0.06) 0.11 (0.96) 0.55* (2.22) 0.44 (1.01) 0.17 (0.37) 0.33 (1.62) 0.42** (1.86) 0.81
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued )
Country Var Constant EDh EDg EDm Posh Negh Posg Negg Posm Negm R Squared
Cote D’Ivoire Dy 0.013 (0.99) 0.25* (2.16) 0.088* (2.81) 0.21* (2.52) 0.0041 (0.07) 0.029 (0.51) 0.051 (1.02) 0.015 (1.18) 0.032 (0.41) 0.03 (0.32) 0.67
Dp 0.052* (2.58) 0.64* (3.52) 0.055 (1.13) 0.67* (5.13) 0.054 (0.58) 0.16** (1.76) 0.14** (1.73) 0.0041 (0.20) 0.57* (4.68) 0.13 (0.85) 0.86
Cyprus Dy 0.097* (2.33) 0.37 (1.40) 0.14* (2.67) 0.42 (1.47) 0.47** (1.71) 0.21 (0.80) 0.31* (3.06) 0.046 (1.50) 0.14 (0.66) 1.37* (3.89) 0.57
Dp 0.006 (0.21) 0.12 (0.65) 0.058 (1.63) 0.21 (1.06) 0.11 (0.60) 0.15 (0.79) 0.08 (1.17) 0.012 (0.58) 0.057 (0.39) 0.023 (0.09) 0.22
Dominica Dy 0.036 (1.25) 1163005 (1.53) 0.34 (0.82) 0.032 (0.27) 1163025 (1.53) 1163007 (1.53) 0.99* (2.78) 0.39 (1.05) 0.092 (0.47) 0.26 (1.07) 0.69
Dp 0.026* (2.26) 408089.6 (1.34) 0.23 (1.35) 0.02 (0.44) 408086.9 (1.34) 408088.4 (1.34) 0.08 (0.56) 0.40* (2.65) 0.0047 (0.06) 0.0078 (0.08) 0.78
Dominican
Republic
Dy 0.062* (3.05) 0.052 (0.63) 0.0015 (0.02) 0.045 (0.46) 0.059 (1.02) 0.032 (0.32) 0.07 (1.41) 0.049** (1.72) 0.25** (1.75) 0.03 (0.22) 0.48
Dp 0.049 (1.15) 0.72* (4.06) 0.078 (0.58) 0.73* (3.53) 0.036 (0.29) 0.47* (2.18) 0.038 (0.37) 0.0041 (0.07) 0.74* (2.46) 0.23 (0.83) 0.72
Ecuador Dy 0.093* (4.28) 0.0093 (0.15) 0.16** (1.74) 0.02 (0.58) 0.19* (2.37) 0.066* (0.49) 0.063 (0.60) 0.028 (0.13) 0.04 (0.75) 0.081 (1.37) 0.50
Dp 0.00065 (0.02) 0.38* (3.51) 0.56* (3.49) 0.097 (1.59) 0.40* (2.89) 0.46* (2.00) 0.15 (0.86) 0.035 (0.09) 0.0054 (0.06) 0.13 (1.26) 0.87
Egypt Dy 0.00 (0.00) 0.50* (2.88) 0.52* (2.07) 0.21 (1.18) 0.095 (1.57) 0.68* (3.49) 0.14 (0.43) 0.12 (0.41) 0.06 (0.33) 0.075 (0.28) 0.48
Dp 0.024 (0.35) 0.75* (2.38) 0.067 (0.15) 0.21 (0.66) 0.14 (1.23) 0.77* (2.17) 0.77 (1.33) 0.23 (0.44) 0.30 (0.90) 0.14 (0.30) 0.69
El Salvador Dy 0.045 (1.62) 0.048 (0.21) 0.22* (1.79) 0.65* (3.02) 0.054 (0.21) 0.34 (0.63) 0.094 (0.96) 0.00028 (0.01) 0.23 (0.87) 0.19 (0.74) 0.37
Dp 0.041 (1.50) 0.31 (1.35) 0.15 (1.24) 0.22 (1.03) 0.92* (3.61) 0.13 (0.24) 0.036 (0.37) 0.026 (1.03) 0.19 (0.71) 0.46** (1.77) 0.78
Ethiopia Dy 0.03 (0.98) 0.056 (0.35) 0.17 (1.20) 0.27 (1.42) 0.17 (1.54) 0.44 (1.52) 0.012 (0.08) 0.013 (0.27) 0.13 (0.42) 0.084 (0.37) 0.35
Dp 0.034 (0.83) 0.41** (1.86) 0.31 (1.64) 0.13 (0.52) 0.037 (0.25) 0.88* (2.27) 0.16 (0.80) 0.0086 (0.13) 0.39 (0.97) 0.088 (0.29) 0.33
Fiji Dy 0.055* (2.18) 0.046 (0.10) 0.0044 (0.02) 0.041 (0.26) 0.93* (2.26) 0.15 (0.29) 0.056 (0.23) 0.25 (1.21) 0.094 (0.50) 0.042 (0.21) 0.30
Dp 0.049* (2.43) 0.077 (0.22) 0.21 (1.38) 0.20 (1.56) 0.20 (0.61) 0.21 (0.51) 0.07 (1.36) 0.11 (0.66) 0.038 (0.26) 0.0033 (0.02) 0.21
Gabon Dy 0.036 (1.01) 0.35 (0.37) 0.0054 (0.04) 0.36* (2.27) 0.098 (0.62) 0.046 (0.19) 0.35* (2.03) 0.048 (0.59) 0.35 (1.40) 0.50* (2.04) 0.48
Dp 0.0019 (0.04) 0.21 (0.18) 0.16 (0.85) 0.18 (0.91) 0.57* (2.92) 0.45 (1.55) 0.26 (1.23) 0.038 (0.38) 0.098 (0.32) 0.35 (1.14) 0.43
Gambia Dy 0.055* (2.04) 0.14 (0.63) 0.064 (0.64) 0.20* (2.01) 0.19 (0.73) 0.12 (0.46) 0.17 (1.25) 0.10** (1.75) 0.022 (0.19) 0.0017 (0.02) 0.40
Dp 0.014 (0.48) 0.17 (0.74) 0.26* (2.47) 0.013 (0.12) 0.24 (0.89) 0.29 (1.10) 0.40* (2.78) 0.20* (3.25) 0.098 (0.80) 0.069 (0.61) 0.58
Ghana Dy 0.053* (1.96) 0.024 (0.48) 0.0074 (0.27) 0.082 (0.70) 0.088** (1.75) 0.20* (2.66) 0.042 (0.76) 0.0057 (0.29) 0.36* (3.16) 0.34* (2.70) 0.42
Dp 0.039 (0.54) 0.23 (1.68) 0.039 (0.54) 1.20* (3.87) 0.33* (2.47) 0.15 (0.74) 0.01 (0.11) 0.018 (0.34) 0.26 (0.86) 0.50 (1.50) 0.69
Grenada Dy 0.057* (4.49) 0.26 (0.54) 0.0038 (0.09) 0.033 (0.35) 0.22 (0.78) 0.87 (1.18) 0.035 (0.91) 0.04 (0.99) 0.032 (0.19) 0.094 (0.64) 0.36
Dp 0.091* (3.63) 3.28* (3.51) 0.00 (0.00) 0.10 (0.54) 0.83 (1.50) 3.37* (2.36) 0.13** (1.70) 0.095** (1.21) 0.039 (0.12) 0.27 (0.93) 0.63
Guatemala Dy 0.03 (1.47) 0.12 (1.28) 0.096 (0.92) 0.12 (0.93) 0.12* (2.11) 0.25 (1.68) 0.076 (0.56) 0.0021 (0.02) 0.0073 (0.09) 0.14 (0.89) 0.41
Dp 0.045 (1.20) 0.10 (0.62) 0.26 (1.36) 0.59* (2.43) 0.52* (5.20) 0.49** (1.83) 0.03 (0.12) 0.12 (0.63) 0.054 (0.36) 0.62* (2.17) 0.81
Guniea Dy 0.045* (2.41) 0.019 (0.17) 0.055 (0.51) 0.072 (0.91) 0.11 (0.70) 0.12 (0.62) 0.07 (0.49) 0.029 (0.41) 0.083 (1.23) 0.18 (1.45) 0.20
Dp 0.05 (1.25) 0.33 (1.39) 0.028 (0.12) 0.54* (3.17) 0.90* (2.55) 0.13 (0.31) 0.07 (0.23) 0.07 (0.46) 0.24 (1.68) 0.29 (1.05) 0.84
Guniea Bissau Dy 0.023 (0.70) 0.054 (0.59) 0.22 (1.42) 0.18 (1.66) 0.057 (0.87) 0.15 (0.77) 0.24** (1.71) 0.022 (0.55) 0.087 (0.53) 0.39* (1.95) 0.30
Dp 0.089 (1.59) 0.026 (0.16) 0.73* (2.73) 0.04 (0.21) 0.15 (1.31) 0.67* (1.95) 0.80* (3.31) 0.010 (0.16) 0.57* (2.02) 0.62** (1.77) 0.62
Haiti Dy 0.00 (0.00) 0.47* (2.43) 0.14* (2.20) 0.077 (0.89) 0.37 (1.58) 0.05 (0.16) 0.18* (2.38) 0.039** (1.75) 0.19 (1.42) 0.17 (1.08) 0.48
Dp 0.034 (1.29) 1.093* (3.38) 0.22* (2.18) 0.081 (0.57) 0.01 (0.03) 0.48 (0.92) 0.34* (2.67) 0.024 (0.65) 0.033 (0.15) 0.053 (0.32) 0.60
Honduras Dy 0.028 (1.12) 0.01 (0.06) 0.036 (0.94) 0.075 (0.34) 0.075 (1.43) 0.032 (0.12) 0.013 (0.19) 0.016 (0.73) 0.13 (0.84) 0.043 (0.24) 0.16
Dp 0.021 (0.96) 0.99* (6.75) 0.072* (2.18) 0.001 (0.01) 0.16* (3.59) 0.43** (1.82) 0.11** (1.80) 0.014 (0.74) 0.18 (1.34) 0.06 (0.39) 0.86
Hungary Dy 0.095* (5.94) 0.13 (1.42) 0.13 (1.09) 0.36* (2.89) 0.85* (3.83) 0.68* (3.09) 1.02* (3.76) 0.24 (1.11) 0.33 (1.61) 0.98* (2.99) 0.72
Dp 0.009 (0.62) 0.60* (7.82) 0.042 (0.41) 0.36* (3.32) 0.66* (3.42) 0.17 (0.88) 1.20* (5.18) 0.71* (3.80) 0.047 (0.27) 1.12* (4.01) 0.94
India Dy 0.008 (0.19) 0.26 (1.54) 0.14 (0.53) 0.003 (0.02) 0.13 (0.87) 0.091 (0.38) 0.10 (0.30) 0.074 (0.18) 0.11 (0.46) 0.23 (0.88) 0.15
Dp 0.23* (4.62) 0.54* (2.66) 0.23 (0.73) 1.03* (4.44) 0.14 (0.81) 0.09 (0.32) 0.038 (0.09) 0.34 (0.68) 0.24 (0.81) 0.96* (3.10) 0.56
Indonesia Dy 0.071* (5.09) 0.14* (2.31) 0.014 (0.79) 0.047 (0.94) 0.19* (9.08) 0.14** (1.89) 0.034 (1.38) 0.022 (0.93) 0.067 (0.79) 0.099 (0.81) 0.82
Dp 0.068 (1.46) 0.93* (4.57) 0.12* (2.03) 0.33* (2.01) 0.43* (6.25) 0.58* (2.34) 0.087 (1.06) 0.054 (0.70) 0.29 (1.02) 0.82* (2.01) 0.86
Iran Dy 0.25* (3.44) 0.14 (0.45) 0.009 (0.10) 1.03* (2.42) 0.083 (0.36) 0.098 (0.32) 0.015 (0.08) 0.011 (0.11) 0.098 (0.26) 0.34 (0.64) 0.39
Dp 0.12 (1.39) 0.53 (1.49) 0.025 (0.24) 1.75* (3.65) 0.81* (3.12) 0.24 (0.69) 0.66* (2.93) 0.12 (1.01) 0.26 (0.59) 0.97 (1.64) 0.71
Jamaica Dy 0.056** (1.91) 0.17 (1.63) 0.074 (0.96) 0.074 (0.66) 0.12 (1.62) 0.16 (1.61) 0.021 (0.29) 0.023 (0.22) 0.13 (1.41) 0.16 (0.98) 0.27
Dp 0.11* (1.86) 0.059 (0.29) 0.22 (1.44) 0.60* (2.75) 0.52* (3.55) 0.30 (1.53) 0.27** (1.88) 0.20 (0.92) 0.53* (2.97) 0.21 (0.67) 0.83
Jordan Dy 0.073** (1.72) 0.016 (0.06) 0.028 (0.56) 0.19 (0.80) 0.70* (3.36) 0.15 (0.37) 0.17 (1.55) 0.05 (1.15) 0.58 (1.32) 0.33 (0.85) 0.42
Dp 0.011 (0.48) 0.0023 (0.02) 0.041 (1.44) 0.63* (4.78) 0.38* (3.25) 0.15 (0.68) 0.013 (0.22) 0.025 (1.03) 0.24 (0.96) 0.11 (0.49) 0.67
Kenya Dy 0.05* (2.17) 0.25* (2.76) 0.008 (0.14) 0.10 (0.80) 0.00 (0.00) 0.15 (1.09) 0.033 (0.52) 0.20* (3.50) 0.067 (0.80) 0.12 (0.99) 0.60
Dp 0.054 (1.48) 0.22 (1.52) 0.011 (0.13) 0.071 (0.34) 0.22** (1.74) 0.30 (1.39) 0.072 (0.69) 0.023 (0.26) 0.25* (1.82) 0.068 (0.35) 0.55
Kuwait Dy 0.015 (0.17) 3.53 (1.42) 0.0067 (0.03) 2.52** (1.81) 0.18 (0.05) 1.62 (0.54) 0.13 (0.28) 0.065 (0.22) 0.31 (0.80) 1.01** (1.83) 0.41
Dp 0.043 (0.28) 2.39 (0.56) 0.12 (0.34) 0.26 (0.52) 0.38 (0.06) 0.35 (0.07) 0.045 (0.06) 0.23 (0.44) 0.057 (0.08) 0.57 (0.60) 0.21
Lao People’s
Dem. Rep.
Dy 0.11* (5.39) 0.035 (0.88) 0.11 (1.04) 0.077 (1.51) 0.042** (1.69) 0.082 (1.27) 0.029 (0.61) 0.18* (2.11) 0.11** (1.69) 0.049 (0.58) 0.59
Dp 0.049 (0.59) 0.15 (0.93) 0.92* (2.14) 0.28 (1.31) 0.071 (0.70) 0.21 (0.78) 0.76* (3.83) 0.60** (1.70) 0.074 (0.27) 0.45 (1.30) 0.83
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Lebanon Dy 0.31* (3.38) 0.37 (1.33) 0.25 (1.64) 0.51 (1.44) 0.091 (0.21) 1.93* (2.88) 0.27 (0.88) 0.57* (2.17) 1.77** (1.71) 0.62 (1.20) 0.49
Dp 0.08* (2.61) 0.36* (3.92) 0.084 (1.65) 0.71* (6.16) 0.61* (4.22) 0.42** (1.93) 0.35* (3.41) 0.01 (0.12) 1.16* (3.43) 0.025 (0.15) 0.97
Lesotho Dy 0.0021 (0.04) 0.15 (0.66) 0.55* (2.85) 0.14 (0.48) 0.081 (0.47) 0.35 (1.54) 0.25 (1.58) 0.071 (0.41) 0.0018 (0.01) 1.10* (7.20) 0.78
Dp 0.05* (2.28) 0.04 (0.40) 0.14** (1.85) 0.48* (4.22) 0.0044 (0.06) 0.03 (0.37) 0.15* (2.38) 0.09 (1.34) 0.02 (0.22) 0.13* (2.12) 0.60
Liberia Dy 0.02 (1.07) 0.02 (0.66) 0.05 (2.85) 0.08* (2.33) 0.002 (0.08) 0.40 (1.20) 0.18 (1.24) 0.35
Dp 0.07* (3.54) 0.012 (0.37) 0.19 (1.31) 0.004 (0.11) 0.02 (0.71) 0.39 (1.13) 0.0021 (0.01) 0.20
Libya Dy 0.024 (0.44) 1.04 (1.48) 0.045 (0.22) 0.31** (1.75) 0.80 (1.47) 0.14 (0.27) 0.36 (1.17) 0.012 (0.06) 0.28 (0.99) 0.33 (0.98) 0.44
Dp 0.062 (0.90) 0.81 (0.92) 0.30 (1.17) 0.075 (0.34) 0.36 (0.54) 0.73 (1.12) 0.058 (0.15) 0.32 (1.23) 0.24 (0.66) 0.66 (1.54) 0.31
Macedonia,
FYR
Dy 0.077* (5.09) 0.012 (0.55) 0.086* (3.14) 0.006 (0.18) 0.07** (1.81) 0.063 (1.56) 0.051 (0.51) 0.05 (0.90) 0.015 (0.34) 0.005 (0.13) 0.77
Dp 0.11* (2.68) 0.009 (0.15) 0.98* (13.18) 0.084 (0.91) 0.056 (0.57) 0.089 (0.81) 0.62* (2.29) 0.60* (4.04) 0.43* (3.78) 0.14 (1.29) 0.98
Madagascar Dy 0.041 (1.36) 0.018 (0.16) 0.036 (0.89) 0.29 (1.11) 0.054 (0.45) 0.00 (0.00) 0.11 (1.34) 0.026 (0.50) 0.013 (0.07) 0.061 (0.35) 0.21
Dp 0.075 (1.53) 0.76* (4.02) 0.076 (1.16) 0.25 (0.76) 0.41* (2.07) 0.087 (0.49) 0.083 (0.64) 0.011 (0.13) 0.18 (0.59) 0.0086 (0.03) 0.63
Malaysia Dy 0.076* (3.30) 0.30 (1.40) 0.12 (1.04) 0.48* (3.97) 0.001 (0.01) 0.0035 (0.04) 0.032 (0.56) 0.10 (1.28) 0.11 (0.73) 0.054 (0.30) 0.76
Dp 0.07** (1.73) 0.89* (2.36) 0.094 (0.67) 0.42 (1.44) 0.21 (0.78) 0.27 (0.87) 0.063 (0.63) 0.28* (2.06) 0.058 (0.28) 0.17 (0.81) 0.39
Maldives Dy 0.04 (1.28) 0.066 (0.50) 0.078 (0.57) 0.25* (2.15) 0.089 (0.71) 0.021 (0.11) 0.21** (1.76) 0.15 (1.63) 0.002 (0.02) 0.50* (3.28) 0.63
Dp 0.054 (1.07) 0.11 (0.51) 0.40** (1.81) 0.24 (1.27) 0.062 (0.30) 0.089 (0.29) 0.058 (0.30) 0.19 (1.28) 0.37* (2.05) 0.043 (0.17) 0.45
Mail Dy 0.11* (2.07) 0.16 (0.52) 1.26* (2.46) 0.047 (0.21) 0.061 (0.50) 0.13 (0.96) 0.34** (1.76) 0.24 (0.95) 0.039 (0.22) 0.24 (1.10) 0.38
Dp 0.066 (1.02) 0.045 (0.11) 0.27 (0.43) 0.11 (0.39) 0.33* (2.18) 0.12 (0.71) 0.54* (2.27) 0.24 (0.78) 0.089 (0.42) 0.63* (2.45) 0.69
Malta Dy 0.011 (0.51) 0.12 (0.43) 0.16 (1.52) 0.46* (3.25) 0.0056 (0.03) 0.058 (0.27) 0.002 (0.01) 0.038 (0.55) 0.31 (1.02) 0.026 (0.08) 0.42
Dp 0.007 (0.42) 0.036 (0.17) 0.096 (1.18) 0.34* (3.08) 0.051 (0.40) 0.28 (1.67) 0.088 (0.72) 0.024 (0.46) 0.21 (0.91) 0.44** (1.76) 0.45
Mauritania Dy 0.047 (1.57) 0.0042 (0.02) 0.08* (2.01) 0.028 (0.23) 0.0016 (0.01) 0.23 (0.67) 0.0022 (0.04) 0.022 (0.40) 0.38 (1.15) 0.047 (0.23) 0.58
Dp 0.07* (1.77) 0.15 (0.50) 0.079 (1.58) 0.044 (0.29) 0.05 (0.21) 0.26 (0.62) 0.031 (0.47) 0.023 (0.33) 0.50 (1.21) 0.17 (0.71) 0.50
Mauritius Dy 0.052 (1.63) 0.21 (0.74) 0.026 (1.24) 0.21 (1.28) 0.21 (0.82) 0.15 (0.58) 0.011 (0.27) 0.025 (0.90) 0.014 (0.10) 0.32* (2.51) 0.39
Dp 0.031 (1.09) 0.89* (3.58) 0.0039 (0.20) 0.59* (4.04) 0.07 (0.31) 0.17 (0.75) 0.014 (0.40) 0.023 (0.93) 0.26* (2.16) 0.041 (0.36) 0.57
Mexico Dy 0.052* (4.27) 0.15* (4.26) 0.025 (0.34) 0.11 (1.17) 0.12* (3.92) 0.09 (1.35) 0.13 (1.42) 0.08 (0.89) 0.01 (0.26) 0.16* (2.38) 0.82
Dp 0.01 (0.28) 0.44* (3.55) 0.64* (2.50) 0.064 (0.20) 0.13 (1.23) 0.56* (2.49) 0.33 (1.04) 0.10 (0.33) 0.07 (0.42) 0.25 (1.05) 0.92
Mongolia Dy 0.06 (1.23) 0.07 (0.66) 0.02 (0.32) 0.03 (0.17) 0.13 (1.24) 0.13 (0.54) 0.04 (0.42) 0.17 (0.93) 0.002 (0.02) 0.04 (0.15) 0.61
Dp 0.06 (0.32) 0.50 (1.18) 0.20 (0.85) 0.21 (0.27) 0.12 (0.27) 0.35 (0.34) 0.27 (0.59) 0.99 (1.26) 0.04 (0.06) 0.20 (0.18) 0.85
Morocco Dy 0.08* (2.39) 0.05 (0.24) 0.23* (2.39) 0.29 (0.91) 0.53* (3.01) 0.36 (1.67) 0.20 (1.46) 0.12** (1.94) 0.18 (0.89) 0.94* (3.09) 0.53
Dp 0.06* (2.09) 0.27 (1.40) 0.008 (1.10) 0.93* (3.49) 0.23 (1.55) 0.05 (0.27) 0.15 (1.26) 0.04 (0.84) 0.27 (1.54) 0.034 (0.13) 0.50
Mozambique Dy 0.04 (1.49) 0.04 (0.27) 0.40** (1.75) 0.51** (1.84) 0.17 (1.15) 0.010 (0.07) 0.55** (1.93) 0.10* (1.98) 0.32 (1.00) 0.06 (0.20) 0.29
Dp 0.006 (0.24) 0.37* (2.38) 0.17 (0.73) 0.42 (1.45) 0.37* (2.34) 0.41* (2.71) 0.23 (0.76) 0.02 (0.31) 0.29 (0.85) 0.33 (1.05) 0.93
Myanmar Dy 0.07* (3.63) 0.61 (1.67) 0.24 (1.39) 0.27* (2.55) 0.00 (0.00) 0.23 (0.86) 0.08 (0.55) 0.03 (0.30) 0.33* (2.25) 0.23* (2.66) 0.48
Dp 0.067 (1.59) 0.11 (0.13) 0.054 (0.13) 0.56* (2.24) 0.33 (0.85) 0.094 (0.15) 0.73* (2.09) 0.17 (0.75) 0.65** (1.89) 0.25 (1.26) 0.55
Namibia Dy 0.096 (1.33) 0.14 (0.90) 0.20 (1.38) 0.11 (0.40) 0.16 (1.31) 0.037 (0.20) 0.30 (1.16) 0.018 (0.13) 0.048 (0.08) 0.0014 (0.001) 0.32
Dp 0.023 (0.27) 0.02 (0.11) 0.40* (2.34) 0.65* (1.97) 0.31* (2.21) 0.22 (1.03) 0.47 (1.56) 0.19 (1.23) 0.72 (0.97) 0.043 (0.12) 0.52
Nepal Dy 0.0004 (0.01) 0.17 (0.78) 0.017 (0.40) 0.14 (0.47) 0.022 (0.16) 0.03 (0.11) 0.025 (0.37) 0.0058 (0.15) 0.12 (0.48) 0.061 (0.31) 0.14
Dp 0.087 (1.42) 0.046 (0.13) 0.072 (1.01) 0.0019 (0.001) 0.022 (0.10) 0.34 (0.78) 0.0043 (0.04) 0.10 (1.60) 0.026 (0.06) 0.15 (0.46) 0.24
Nicaragua Dy 0.059* (2.54) 0.085 (1.36) 0.02 (0.46) 0.06 (1.36) 0.019 (0.41) 0.006 (0.12) 0.017 (0.22) 0.075* (2.48) 0.17* (2.28) 0.024 (0.31) 0.49
Dp 0.085 (0.97) 0.62* (2.64) 0.27 (1.60) 0.41* (2.50) 0.14 (0.77) 0.71* (3.63) 0.57** (1.94) 0.26* (2.32) 0.34 (1.22) 0.65* (2.24) 0.98
Niger Dy 0.017 (0.37) 0.92 (1.20) 0.29 (0.75) 0.29 (0.96) 0.054 (0.42) 0.038 (0.18) 0.58 (1.42) 0.39 (0.73) 0.063 (0.21) 0.27 (1.05) 0.37
Dp 0.031 (1.11) 0.46 (1.00) 0.37 (1.55) 0.25 (1.33) 0.30* (3.82) 0.12 (0.92) 0.35 (1.43) 0.57** (1.76) 0.68* (3.79) 0.20 (1.32) 0.75
Nigeria Dy 0.024 (0.46) 0.0062 (0.03) 0.04 (0.19) 0.29 (1.16) 0.21 (1.17) 0.032 (0.13) 0.12 (0.71) 0.029 (0.11) 0.045 (0.25) 0.44* (1.99) 0.22
Dp 0.0032 (0.05) 0.29 (1.30) 0.083 (0.32) 0.49 (1.59) 0.33 (1.54) 0.76* (2.45) 0.24 (1.12) 0.23 (0.69) 0.17 (0.79) 0.36 (1.34) 0.61
Oman Dy 0.042** (1.75) 0.41 (0.31) 0.0006 (0.01) 0.41* (3.36) 1.19 (1.53) 1.26** (1.73) 0.004 (0.02) 0.017 (0.11) 0.087 (0.20) 1.07* (3.44) 0.65
Dp 0.013 (0.30) 2.80 (1.16) 0.025 (0.20) 0.59* (2.62) 1.18 (0.83) 0.95 (0.71) 0.53** (1.71) 0.25 (0.93) 0.85 (1.09) 0.23 (0.41) 0.46
Pakistan Dy 0.03 (1.37) 0.12 (0.99) 0.067 (0.70) 0.17 (1.42) 0.063 (0.94) 0.14 (1.00) 0.49* (2.98) 0.017 (0.26) 0.24** (1.70) 0.40* (3.69) 0.58
Dp 0.025 (0.60) 0.23 (0.95) 0.72* (3.80) 0.39 (1.67) 0.01 (0.08) 0.11 (0.38) 0.26 (0.83) 0.077 (0.61) 0.042 (0.15) 0.066 (0.31) 0.52
Panama Dy 0.044* (3.47) 0.067 (0.78) 0.16 (1.50) 0.0061 (0.07) 0.023 (0.21) 0.021 (0.18) 0.35* (3.27) 0.44
Dp 0.014 (1.35) 0.19* (2.59) 0.18* (2.01) 0.13** (1.70) 0.032 (0.33) 0.10 (1.07) 0.039 (0.44) 0.26
Papua New
Guinea
Dy 0.038 (0.77) 0.32 (1.43) 0.017 (0.18) 0.29 (0.56) 0.15 (1.01) 0.13 (0.63) 0.079 (0.73) 0.01 (0.19) 0.18 (0.68) 0.57 (1.52) 0.25
Dp 0.039 (0.64) 0.026 (0.09) 0.0043 (0.04) 0.044 (0.07) 0.51* (2.92) 0.018 (0.07) 0.015 (0.11) 0.026 (0.40) 0.67* (2.15) 0.11 (0.24) 0.45
Paraguay Dy 0.035 (1.49) 0.11** (1.73) 0.055 (1.29) 0.044 (0.38) 0.068 (0.70) 0.11 (0.67) 0.11* (2.09) 0.01 (0.55) 0.16 (1.29) 0.099 (1.12) 0.42
Dp 0.0074 (0.15) 0.071 (0.51) 0.14 (1.56) 0.70* (2.92) 0.097 (0.48) 0.013 (0.04) 0.044 (0.40) 0.00005 (0.001) 0.012 (0.05) 0.24 (1.28) 0.63
Peru Dy 0.038* (3.64) 0.063 (1.68) 0.027* (2.85) 0.064** (1.87) 0.17* (3.10) 0.12* (2.68) 0.013* (2.51) 0.0028 (0.54) 0.14* (2.44) 0.06 (1.24) 0.77
Dp 0.005 (0.13) 0.96* (7.07) 0.023 (0.69) 0.14 (1.12) 0.81* (4.08) 0.61* (3.61) 0.011 (0.59) 0.019 (1.04) 0.095 (0.45) 0.37* (2.30) 0.99
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued )
Country Var Constant EDh EDg EDm Posh Negh Posg Negg Posm Negm R Squared
Philippines Dy 0.05** (1.71) 0.56* (2.61) 0.09 (1.44) 0.19 (1.55) 0.08 (0.85) 0.18 (1.11) 0.038 (0.32) 0.01 (0.44) 0.038 (0.31) 0.023 (0.14) 0.49
Dp 0.094 (1.55) 0.73 (1.58) 0.24** (1.74) 0.23 (0.85) 0.32 (1.64) 0.17 (0.48) 0.12 (0.50) 0.049 (0.96) 0.33 (1.26) 0.48 (1.40) 0.49
Poland Dy 0.058* (4.97) 0.17* (2.06) 0.06 (0.78) 0.06** (1.71) 0.16 (1.68) 0.034 (0.55) 0.11 (1.58) 0.071 (0.73) 0.015 (0.34) 0.088* (2.76) 0.66
Dp 0.020 (0.81) 0.47* (2.72) 0.72* (4.37) 0.085 (1.24) 0.17 (0.83) 0.39* (2.97) 0.33* (2.22) 0.91* (4.45) 0.035 (0.38) 0.021 (0.03) 0.97
Qatar Dy 0.024 (0.80) 0.74 (0.53) 0.01 (0.06) 0.019 (0.12) 2.26 (0.69) 0.82 (0.50) 0.54 (1.58) 0.34* (2.05) 0.20 (0.82) 0.062 (0.28) 0.49
Dp 0.037 (0.61) 2.05 (0.72) 0.36 (1.03) 0.051 (0.16) 3.09 (0.45) 2.21 (0.65) 0.90 (1.27) 0.81* (2.39) 0.37 (0.73) 0.43 (0.97) 0.41
Russia Dy 0.026* (2.26) 0.065* (3.52) 0.03 (0.78) 0.096** (1.70) 0.015 (0.70) 0.16* (3.38) 0.12 (1.46) 0.096 (0.95) 0.043 (0.43) 0.086 (0.91) 0.91
Dp 0.045** (1.88) 0.20* (5.06) 0.41* (5.09) 0.64* (5.33) 0.16* (3.59) 0.23* (2.27) 0.25 (1.50) 0.36 (1.68) 0.47* (2.21) 0.61* (3.01) 0.99
Rwanda Dy 0.055 (1.28) 0.18 (0.58) 0.21 (1.61) 0.014 (0.04) 0.58* (2.15) 0.14 (0.39) 0.17 (1.27) 0.44* (4.04) 0.068 (0.25) 0.13 (0.39) 0.82
Dp 0.092* (2.47) 0.52* (1.98) 0.021 (0.19) 1.04* (3.70) 0.062 (0.27) 0.40 (1.23) 0.21** (1.80) 0.05 (0.51) 0.30 (1.31) 0.38 (1.35) 0.71
Sao Tome &
Principe
Dy 0.058** (1.78) 0.0059 (0.05) 0.061 (0.32) 0.15 (1.04) 0.20 (1.03) 0.38* (2.14) 0.042 (0.29) 0.14 (1.13) 0.069 (0.57) 0.30** (1.71) 0.35
Dp 0.032 (0.57) 0.59* (3.19) 0.082 (0.26) 0.38 (1.62) 0.55* (1.69) 0.26 (0.87) 0.18 (0.73) 0.069 (0.33) 0.012 (0.06) 0.58* (1.95) 0.82
Saudi Arabia Dy 0.035 (1.64) 1.83* (2.93) 0.16 (1.19) 0.10 (0.69) 0.24 (0.14) 0.50 (0.28) 0.055 (0.31) 0.096 (0.47) 0.012 (0.04) 0.13 (0.39) 0.52
Dp 0.019 (0.45) 1.10 (0.91) 0.54* (2.11) 0.08 (0.28) 0.73 (0.23) 1.74 (0.50) 0.25 (0.73) 0.75** (1.89) 0.53 (0.86) 0.82 (1.26) 0.55
Senegal Dy 0.013 (0.49) 0.11 (0.58) 0.11 (0.81) 0.089 (0.39) 0.04 (0.37) 0.062 (0.45) 0.008 (0.04) 0.024 (0.57) 0.007 (0.04) 0.014 (0.08) 0.17
Dp 0.001 (0.03) 0.14 (0.66) 0.38* (2.39) 0.015 (0.06) 0.13 (1.10) 0.12 (0.78) 0.45* (2.16) 0.07 (1.34) 0.26 (1.47) 0.04 (0.19 0.17
Sierra Leone Dy 0.048 (1.51) 0.05 (0.54) 0.065 (0.37) 0.13 (0.82) 0.19 (0.94) 0.03 (0.81) 0.12* (2.80) 0.18* (2.11) 0.19 (1.28) 0.24** (1.91) 0.45
Dp 0.0005 (0.01) 0.42* (3.24) 0.05 (0.94) 0.79* (2.74) 0.13 (0.81) 0.44* (2.43) 0.059 (0.99) 0.088 (0.73) 0.16 (0.64) 0.36 (1.60) 0.91
Solvak
Republic
Dy 0.064* (2.84) 0.12* (3.31) 0.56* (2.69) 0.21 (1.29) 0.12 (0.69) 0.12 (0.62) 0.25 (0.96) 0.40 (1.24) 1.19** (1.82) 0.64 (1.23) 0.88
Dp 0.062* (2.58) 0.018 (0.47) 0.53* (2.38) 0.90* (5.30) 0.18 (0.98) 0.047 (0.23) 0.32 (1.15) 0.62** (1.81) 2.00* (2.88) 0.60 (1.07) 0.94
Slovenia Dy 0.056* (7.32) 0.072* (2.52) 0.016 (0.48) 0.016 (0.41) 0.021 (0.60) 0.042** (1.71) 0.023 (0.26) 0.01 (0.15) 0.036 (0.82) 0.042 (1.14) 0.74
Dp 0.089* (4.50) 0.048 (0.66) 0.96* (15.26) 0.095 (1.06) 0.038 (0.33) 0.13 (1.41) 0.89* (3.89) 0.75* (4.41) 0.33* (3.83) 0.0058 (0.06) 0.99
Solomon
Islands
Dy 0.012 (0.53) 0.096 (0.47) 0.22 (1.39) 0.14 (0.68) 0.14 (1.00) 0.13** (1.81) 0.30* (2.23) 0.028 (0.60) 0.33 (1.25) 0.054 (0.25) 0.54
Dp 0.071* (2.40) 0.034 (0.12) 0.11 (1.15) 0.31** (1.71) 0.098 (0.28) 0.32 (1.13) 0.078 (0.43) 0.065 (1.05) 0.19 (0.88) 0.075 (0.28) 0.58
South Africa Dy 0.054* (2.70) 0.097 (0.87) 0.026 (0.20) 0.16 (1.17) 0.081 (0.88) 0.21 (1.48) 0.017 (0.12) 0.17 (0.98) 0.014 (0.17) 0.014 (0.14) 0.36
Dp 0.021 (0.94) 0.12 (0.94) 0.65* (4.05) 0.019 (0.18) 0.06 (0.65) 0.18 (1.48) 0.66* (4.26) 0.67* (3.40) 0.042 (0.29) 0.31* (1.97) 0.71
Sri Lanka Dy 0.041* (2.33) 0.066 (0.52) 0.012 (0.10) 0.10 (0.83) 0.019 (0.20) 0.0056 (0.27) 0.087* (2.05) 0.014 (0.23) 0.04 (0.62) 0.21 (1.31) 0.40
Dp 0.11* (2.57) 0.14 (0.47) 0.084 (1.67) 0.11 (0.47) 0.027 (0.17) 0.50 (1.30) 0.13 (1.31) 0.12 (0.79) 0.28 (1.02) 0.17 (0.57) 0.32
St. Kitts and
Nevis
Dy 0.03** (1.86) 0.15 (0.37) 0.039 (1.01) 0.14 (1.27) 0.039 (0.25) 0.15 (0.33) 0.034 (0.73) 0.0099 (0.35) 0.27* (1.95) 0.039 (0.53) 0.31
Dp 0.02 (0.37) 1.42 (1.03) 0.016 (0.12) 0.31 (0.81) 0.46 (0.84) 1.12 (0.72) 0.053 (0.34) 0.073 (0.75) 1.04* (2.21) 0.26 (1.02) 0.38
St. Lucia Dy 0.034 (1.51) 0.78** (1.92) 0.029 (0.54) 0.19 (0.95) 0.076 (0.29) 0.28 (0.48) 0.043 (0.35) 0.0021 (0.03) 0.055 (0.29) 0.50 (1.68) 0.37
Dp 0.037 (1.18) 0.28 (0.50) 0.033 (0.44) 0.66* (2.38) 0.066 (0.18) 0.23 (0.29) 0.42* (2.48) 0.051 (0.49) 0.49** (1.84) 0.46** (1.84) 0.63
St. Vincent &
Grendines
Dy 0.013 (0.65) 0.23 (0.60) 0.015 (0.35) 0.29** (1.85) 0.048 (0.36) 0.062 (0.16) 0.0059 (0.12) 0.033 (1.19) 0.35* (2.23) 0.20 (1.19) 0.47
Dp 0.052* (2.31) 0.50 (1.10) 0.074 (1.45) 0.53* (2.91) 0.27** (1.75) 0.21 (0.49) 0.17* (3.07) 0.07* (2.05) 0.49* (2.69) 0.28 (1.37) 0.61
Suriname Dy 0.033 (1.31) 0.062 (0.66) 0.057 (0.41) 0.14 (0.90) 0.20* (2.10) 0.015 (0.10) 0.17 (0.71) 0.0067 (0.03) 0.083 (0.39) 0.17 (0.64) 0.35
Dp 0.043 (0.83) 0.43* (2.23) 1.09* (3.74) 0.06 (0.19) 0.18 (0.89) 0.43 (1.41) 1.06* (2.18) 0.21 (0.44) 0.12 (0.28) 0.96** (1.76) 0.92
Swaziland Dy 0.094* (3.43) 0.20 (1.53) 0.04 (0.63) 0.061 (0.37) 0.10 (1.05) 0.44* (2.00) 0.12 (1.28) 0.23* (2.10) 0.26 (0.77) 0.032 (0.11) 0.50
Dp 0.065** (1.85) 0.02 (0.12) 0.027 (0.30) 0.37** (1.80) 0.072 (0.55) 0.26 (0.92) 0.10 (0.86) 0.047 (0.35) 0.71 (1.68) 0.66* (1.74) 0.40
Syrian Arab
Republic
Dy 0.042 (0.66) 0.028 (0.33) 0.065 (0.47) 0.073 (0.15) 0.20** (1.73) 0.37 (1.64) 0.036 (0.20) 0.15* (2.56) 0.94* (2.44) 0.46 (1.14) 0.53
Dp 0.045 (0.71) 0.16** (1.88) 0.047 (0.34) 0.64 (1.33) 0.24* (2.14) 0.025 0.11) 0.0094 (0.05) 0.07 (1.17) 0.18 (0.47) 0.41 (1.02) 0.50
Tanzania Dy 0.11 (0.46) 0.004 (0.06) 0.02 (0.62) 0.056 (0.35) 0.033 (1.09) 0.054 (0.64) 0.35 (0.79) 0.046 (0.81) 0.0053 (0.06) 0.039 (0.41) 0.17
Dp 0.057 (0.80) 0.08 (0.42) 0.68* (7.14) 0.50 (1.08) 0.20* (2.21) 0.23 (0.95) 0.15 (1.13) 0.16 (0.97) 0.32 (1.23) 0.018 (0.07) 0.84
Thailand Dy 0.10* (6.63) 0.47* (2.48) 0.046 (0.53) 0.20* (2.55) 0.47* (3.08) 0.029 (0.12) 0.09 (0.85) 0.0081 (0.50) 0.17 (1.51) 0.069 (0.48) 0.79
Dp 0.053 (1.68) 0.18 (0.45) 0.35** (1.91) 0.079 (0.49) 0.39 (1.24) 0.71 (1.37) 0.10 (0.48) 0.013 (0.38) 0.095 (0.40) 0.55** (1.80) 0.34
Togo Dy 0.015 (0.66) 0.026 (0.24) 0.21 (1.35) 0.15 (1.15) 0.023 (0.14) 0.18 (0.95) 0.35* (2.14) 0.01* (2.10) 0.031 (0.38) 0.085 (0.85) 0.39
Dp 0.025 (1.17) 0.25* (2.47) 0.42* (2.90) 0.20 (1.58) 0.26** (1.74) 0.15 (0.83) 0.25 (1.62) 0.04 (0.90) 0.12 (1.57) 0.12 (1.24) 0.64
Tonga Dy 0.021 (0.83) 0.077 (0.12) 0.016 (0.41) 0.051 (0.34) 0.11 (0.46) 0.13 (0.41) 0.064 (0.45) 0.066 (0.36) 0.26 (0.76) 0.08 (0.43) 0.24
Dp 0.052** (1.82) 0.74 (0.98) 0.018 (0.39) 0.064 (0.37) 0.11 (0.41) 0.25 (0.69) 0.061 (0.37) 0.18 (0.83) 0.27 (0.69) 0.14 (0.68) 0.46
Trinidad and
Tobago
Dy 0.039 (1.36) 0.39 (0.83) 0.049 (0.40) 0.023 (0.73) 0.042 (0.25) 0.076 (0.18) 0.00015 (0.01) 0.011 (0.55) 0.0072 (0.03) 0.36* (1.97) 0.29
Dp 0.037 (0.95) 0.68 (1.05) 0.051 (1.16) 0.46* (2.75) 0.25 (1.13) 0.62 (1.08) 0.021 (0.52) 0.0025 (0.09) 0.015 (0.05) 0.35 (1.40) 0.38
Tunisia Dy 0.061* (2.42) 0.26** (1.78) 0.049 (1.33) 0.17 (0.91) 0.019 (0.08) 0.12 (0.58) 0.16* (2.27) 0.032 (1.39) 0.036 (0.15) 0.28 (1.02) 0.46
Dp 0.015 (0.99) 0.51* (5.58) 0.027 (1.22) 0.39* (3.48) 0.043 (0.32) 0.08 (0.65) 0.054 (1.23) 0.017 (1.17) 0.22 (1.48) 0.21 (1.22) 0.70
Turkey Dy 0.10* (2.75) 0.12 (0.79) 0.0011 (0.05) 0.29 (1.35) 0.079 (1.38) 0.13 (1.29) 0.0093 (0.28) 0.0051 (0.52) 0.19 (1.29) 0.069 (0.44) 0.43
Dp 0.15** (1.71) 1.14* (3.06) 0.018 (0.35) 0.31 (0.60) 0.40* (2.96) 0.28 (1.16) 0.087 (1.09) 0.010 (0.43) 0.49 (1.38) 1.02* (2.73) 0.89
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The time-series evidence indicates a wide variation in the
effects of monetary shocks on output growth and price infla-
tion across developing countries. In light of this evidence, two
questions are worthy of further investigation: (i) what are the
major factors that might explain the difference in the effects of
monetary shocks across countries?, and (ii) what are the im-
plications of the observed differences to economic perfor-
mance across countries?5.1. Determinants of the difference in the effects of
monetary shocksA number of structural parameters, on the demand or supply
sides of the economy, may underlie observed differences in the
effects of monetary shocks across countries. Given data limi-
tation, cross-country analysis will account for a number of
specific factors. The real effects of monetary shocks are likely
to vary with price flexibility, demand elasticity, and policy
variability. Two cross-country regressions are estimated.14 In
the first regression, the real effects of monetary shocks, byp and
byn vary with the inflationary effects of monetary shocks, b5pp
or b5pn in model (4), the elasticity of aggregate demand in the
face of monetary shocks, g2p or g2n in model (2), and the
variability of monetary shocks, sms. The second regression
incorporates price flexibility along the short-run supply curve,
a3p or a3n in model (1), the size of demand shifts, and mon-
etary variability.15
In regression (1) of Table 2, the response of output growth to
expansionary monetary shocks decreases significantly with the
flexibility of price inflation in the face of monetary shocks, b5pp.
This indicates a strong trade-off between the real and infla-
tionary effects of monetary shocks, reflecting supply-side con-
straints that necessitate higher inflation in the face of capacity
limitations. The real effect of monetary shocks increases
significantly with the size of demand expansion, implying more
effectiveness the stronger the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy to aggregate demand. The variability of14 Estimates from the time-series models are employed in the cross-section
regressions, having been weighted by the inverse of the standard error. That
is, parameters that are more variable are weighted less heavily in the cross-
section model.
15 Higher monetary variability increases uncertainty, which may decrease
credibility and counter the effectiveness of monetary policy. The equilibrium
story pioneered by Lucas (1973) suggests that in economies that are charac-
terized with a history of high demand variability, agents are less likely to
interpret “noise” as indicative of changes in demand; the result will be a
steeper supply schedule and a nearly vertical Phillips curve. The contractual
wage rigidity explanation of business cycles (see, e.g., Gray & Kandil, 1991)
suggests that wages are more flexible in response to demand shifts the higher
demand uncertainty. More flexible wages are consistent with a steeper supply
schedule. Similarly, the sticky-price explanation of business cycles (see, e.g.,
Ball, Mankiw, & Romer, 1988) advocates that prices are more flexible the
higher uncertainty about demand shifts. More flexible prices are consistent
with a steeper aggregate supply curve.
Table 2
Determinants of the real effects of expansionary and contractionary monetary shocks across countries.
Regression Dependent variable Constant Price flexibility Demand elasticity Variability sms R squared
(1) b5pp g2p
Expansionary effect of monetary shocks ¼ b5yp 0.064* (2.15) 0.59* (7.86) 0.78* (7.45) 0.015 (0.24) 0.40
(2) a3p g2p
Expansionary effect of monetary shocks ¼ b5yp 0.085 (1.09) 0.17* (1.99) 0.30* (2.91) 0.016 (0.21) 0.091
(3) b5pn g2n
Contractionary effect of monetary shocks ¼ b5yn 0.012 (0.41) 0.64* (9.56) 0.85* (11.31) 0.0042 (0.07) 0.58
(4) a3n g2n
Contractionary effect of monetary shocks ¼ b5yn 0.038 (0.47) 0.029 (0.33) 0.53* (5.82) 0.012 (0.15) 0.23
b5yp, b5yn are the parameters measuring the response of real output growth to expansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (3).
b5pp, b5pn are the parameters measuring the response of price inflation to expansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (4).
a3p, a3n are the parameters measuring the response of price inflation to expansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (1).
l2p, g2n are the parameters measuring the response of aggregate demand shocks to expansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (2).
sms is the standard deviation of shocks to the growth of the money supply.
t-ratios are in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the five percent level.
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expansion across countries, ruling out the effect of uncertainty
on monetary policy effectiveness.
The second regression in Table 2 isolates the effects of
supply-side and demand-side determinants. Output expansion
decreases significantly the steeper the aggregate supply curve
across countries, providing further evidence regarding the role
of capacity constraints in hindering output adjustment and
escalating price inflation. This is evident by the negative and
significant response to the parameter measuring upward price
flexibility along the aggregate supply curve, a3p. In addition,
output expansion increases significantly with the elasticity of
aggregate demand in the face of expansionary monetary
shocks, reinforcing the importance of demand elasticity to the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
The evidence appears robust for the real effects of
contractionary monetary shocks across countries. In regression
(3) of Table 2, output fluctuations in the face of monetary
shocks, b5pn, varies negatively and significantly with down-
ward price flexibility. The implication is output contraction is
more moderate the greater the price adjustment with respect to
contractionary shocks and vice versa. Furthermore, output
contraction increases significantly the larger the elasticity of
aggregate demand in the face of monetary shocks, reinforcing
the role of elastic demand to the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy.
In the last regression of Table 2, supply-side constraints
appear less binding in the face of negative monetary shocks.
The effect of downward price flexibility along the aggregate
supply curve, a3n, is negative but not significant.
16 In contrast,
output contraction increases with the elasticity of aggregate
demand in the face of negative monetary shocks, implying16 This is consistent with a more binding capacity constraint in the face of
monetary expansion. That is, the aggregate supply curve is generally steeper in
the face of expansionary aggregate demand shifts. To formalize this evidence,
the difference between upward and downward price flexibility in the empirical
model (1) is positive and statistically significant in fifty six countries.larger contraction the bigger the demand contraction with
respect to a reduction in liquidity. This is evident by the
positive and significant parameter in regression (4) of Table 2.5.2. Monetary shocks and economic performanceThe analysis of this section evaluates variation in the trend
and variability of output growth and price inflation with the
effects of monetary shocks across countries.
5.2.1. Variation in trend output growth with monetary
shocks
Trend real output growth is measured by the time-series
average of the first-difference of the log value of real output,
Dy. Table 3 presents the evidence of variation in trend real
output growth with the effects of monetary shocks across
countries.
The first regression evaluates variation in trend real output
growth with output expansion, b5yp, demand expansion, g2p,
and the variability of monetary shocks, sms, across countries.
Trend output growth increases significantly with the expan-
sionary effect of monetary policy shocks, implying an impor-
tant role for monetary policy to revive growth by availing
liquidity for capacity building.
The second regression in Table 3 evaluates variation in
trend real output growth with output contraction, b5yn, demand
contraction, g2n, and the variability of monetary shocks, sms.
None of the parameters is statistically significant in this
regression, ruling out the relevance of monetary contraction to
differences in trend growth across countries.
Regression (3) evaluates the effects of both expansionary
and contractionary monetary shocks on trend real output
growth. In addition, the cross-country regression accounts for
demand shifts in the face of demand expansion and contrac-
tion and for the variability of monetary shocks. Trend output
growth increases significantly with the expansionary effect of
monetary shocks, b5yp. Trend output growth increases despite
the effects of monetary contraction, as evident by the positive
and statistically significant response to b5yn across countries.
The results indicate that monetary policy plays a vital role in
Table 3
The effects of fluctuations in monetary shocks on trend real output growth across countries.
Regression Dependent variable Constant b5yp b5yn g2p g2n sms R squared
Average real output growth
(1) Dy 0.038* (22.38) 0.01* (2.40) 0.003 (0.63) 0.0024 (0.66) 0.053
(2) Dy 0.037* (20.37) 0.0063 (1.43) 0.0041 (0.85) 0.002 (0.53) 0.047
(3) Dy 0.038* (18.02) 0.015* (3.06) 0.012* (2.64) 0.004 (0.83) 0.002 (0.39) 0.0023 (0.63) 0.12
Dy denotes the time-series average of real output growth.
b5yp, b5yn are the parameters measuring the response of real output growth to expansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (3).
g2p, g2n are the parameters measuring the response of aggregate demand shocks to expansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (2).
sms is the standard deviation of shocks to the growth of the money supply.
t-ratios are in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the five percent level.
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asymmetric. That is, capacity building is highly dependent on
available liquidity and appears to be robust to cyclical dry up
in liquidity during monetary contraction.
Table 4 presents the evidence regarding variation in trend
price inflation across countries. In regression one, trend price
inflation is regressed on the inflationary effect of expansionary
monetary policy, b5pp, demand expansion, g2p, as well as on
the variability of monetary shocks, sms. Judged by statistical
significance, the variability of monetary shocks increases trend
price inflation significantly. The evidence remains robust in
regression (2), which accounts for the deflationary effect of
monetary policy, b5pn, and the size of demand contraction, g2n.
Higher monetary variability increases uncertainty and in-
creases the speed of price adjustment, escalating trend price
inflation.
Regression (3) combines the inflationary and deflationary
effects of monetary shocks. A larger response of price inflation
to contractionary demand shocks has a positive and significantTable 4
The effects of fluctuations in monetary shocks on trend price inflation across coun
Regression Dependent variable Constant b5pp b5pn
Average price inflation
(1) Dp 0.097* (6.72) 0.019 (0.52)
(2) Dp 0.10* (6.76) 0.056
(3) Dp 0.091* (5.10) 0.05 (1.28) 0.081*
Dp denotes the time-series average of price inflation.
b5pp, b5pn are the parameters measuring the response of price inflation to expansio
g2p, g2n are the parameters measuring the response of aggregate demand shocks t
sms is the standard deviation of shocks to the growth of the money supply.
t-ratios are in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the five percent lev
Table 5
The effects of fluctuations in monetary shocks on the variability of real output gro
Regression Dependent variable Constant b5yp b5yn
Variability of real output growth
(1) sy 0.051* (15.94) 0.029* (3.56)
(2) sy 0.055* (15.89) 0.001
(3) sy 0.052* (12.90) 0.034* (3.69) 0.016*
sy denotes the standard deviation of real output growth.
b5yp, b5yn are the parameters measuring the response of real output growth to exp
b5pp, b5pn are the parameters measuring the response of price inflation to expansio
g2p, g2n are the parameters measuring the response of aggregate demand shocks t
sms is the standard deviation of shocks to the growth of the money supply.
t-ratios are in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the five percent leveffect on trend price inflation across countries. Trend price
inflation appears to be increasing despite the deflationary ef-
fects of monetary shocks, ruling out the importance of cyclical
monetary contraction in deviating trend inflation form its
steady-state path. Further, the variability of monetary shocks
increases trend price inflation significantly across countries.
Higher monetary variability increases inflationary expectation,
which contributes to a higher trend inflation across countries.
5.2.2. The destabilizing effects of monetary variability
In Table 5, the dependent variable (the standard deviation
of real output growth) is regressed on the output response to
monetary shocks, b5yp and/or b5yn, the size of demand shifts,
g2p and/or g2n, and the variability of monetary shocks, sms,
across countries.
In regression (1), output variability decreases significantly
with the effect of expansionary monetary shocks on real
growth. In regression (3), the variability of output growth
decreases significantly with the effects of expansionary andtries.
g2p g2n sms R squared
0.019 (0.37) 0.24* (7.72) 0.35
(1.59) 0.045 (1.14) 0.24* (7.33) 0.36
(2.10) 0.0046 (0.09) 0.048 (1.22) 0.24* (7.79) 0.38
nary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (4).
o expansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (2).
el.
wth across countries.
g2p g2n sms R squared
0.0021 (0.23) 0.0010 (0.15) 0.11
9 (0.22) 0.014 (1.52) 0.00027 (0.04) 0.031
* (1.77) 0.0026 (0.28) 0.00061 (0.06) 0.00057 (0.08) 0.14
ansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (3).
nary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (4).
o expansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (2).
el.
Table 6
The effects of fluctuations in monetary shocks on the variability of price inflation across countries.
Regression Dependent variable Constant b5pp b5pn g2p g2n sms R squared
Variability of price inflation
(1) sp 0.12* (4.85) 0.049 (0.81) 0.002 (0.02) 0.34* (6.45) 0.28
(2) sp 0.13* (4.96) 0.11** (1.80) 0.096 (1.47) 0.33* (6.48) 0.29
(3) sp 0.11* (3.68) 0.11 (1.65) 0.15* (2.40) 0.03 (0.36) 0.11 (1.60) 0.34* (6.53) 0.32
sp denotes the standard deviation of price inflation.
b5pp, b5pn are the parameters measuring the response of price inflation to expansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (4).
g2p, g2n are the parameters measuring the response of aggregate demand shocks to expansionary and contractionary shocks in the empirical model (2).
sms is the standard deviation of shocks to the growth of the money supply.
t-ratios are in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the five percent level.
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tuations in the face of both positive and negative monetary
shocks are stabilizing, decreasing the variability of real output
growth across countries.
The evidence in Table 6 appears in sharp contrast. The
variability of price inflation varies positively and significantly
with the inflationary effects of monetary shocks. Monetary
shocks increase the trend and variability of price inflation
across countries. Consistently, the variability of monetary
shocks has a positive and statistically significant effect on the
variability of price inflation across countries.
6. Summary and conclusion
Monetary policy is an important policy instrument to achieve
targeted results. The analysis of monetary policy is compli-
cated, however, by confusion over the objectives of monetary
policy. Announced objectives may vary based on established
priorities. In a small open economy, monetary policy may be
targeting a fixed exchange rate. Concerns, however, may arise
about inflation which may warrant an inflation targeting strat-
egy. Alternatively, the priorities of monetary policy may aim at
stabilizing real output growth.
In developing countries, the analysis of monetary policy
has been hampered by the lack of a clear announcement of the
direction of monetary policy. The common perception is that
central banks in many developing countries are obligated to
finance the growing deficits in government finances. A thor-
ough investigation of the role of monetary policy in devel-
oping countries has not been carried out before. Based on data
availability, empirical time-series models are estimated for a
sample of 105 countries. The estimation illustrates the allo-
cation of monetary growth shocks between output growth and
price inflation.
There are two channels that underlie the interaction be-
tween monetary growth shocks and the aggregate economy: an
aggregate demand channel and an aggregate supply channel.
On the demand side, the elasticity of aggregate demand with
respect to the underlying monetary shock captures a composite
of structural parameters that govern the transmission mecha-
nism of monetary policy and determine the response of various
spending components to monetary growth. On the supply side,
constraints in the labor and output markets determine flexi-
bility to adjust the output produced.Cross country regressions analyze important factors that
differentiate the allocation of monetary growth shocks be-
tween output growth and price inflation. Three factors are
under consideration: price flexibility, demand elasticity, and
monetary uncertainty. The more binding supply-side con-
straints, the more flexible are prices and the smaller is the
response of output growth to monetary shocks. Capacity
constraints appear to be particularly binding, limiting output
adjustment in the face of expansionary monetary shocks.
Output fluctuations are also exacerbated with the size of de-
mand shifts that vary with demand elasticities in the face of
monetary shocks. The variability of monetary shocks does not
differentiate the size of output fluctuations across countries,
ruling out the relevance of aggregate uncertainty to output
adjustment.
Next, the investigation evaluates the effects of monetary
shocks on economic performance across countries. Expan-
sionary monetary shocks increase trend output growth across
countries, establishing the importance of monetary growth to
capacity building. Additionally, monetary policy shocks are
stabilizing, reducing the variability of output growth as mon-
etary growth mitigates fluctuations away from steady-state
trends. Fluctuations in monetary growth increase the trend
and variability of price inflation across countries, indicating
more flexibility of prices to absorb the monetary shock.
Monetary policy is an important instrument of economic
development. To maximize the effects of monetary policy, a
number of structural constraints needs to be addressed. On the
demand side, monetary policy should aim at maximizing the
positive effect of credit availability on private spending by
addressing structural bottlenecks that block the transmission
mechanism and interfere with demand elasticity. This requires
refraining from heavy reliance on monetary policy to finance
government spending, increasing inflationary expectations and
crowding out private activity. Policy credibility is also impor-
tant to curb inflationary expectations that could trigger a cycle
of capital outflows and reduce inflows. The success of mone-
tary policy in controlling inflationary expectation is necessary
to stabilize the exchange rate, safeguard competitiveness, and
anchor inflationary expectations toward achieving macroeco-
nomic stability. On the supply side, failure to stimulate output
growth in the face of monetary fluctuations should signal
concerns about capacity constraints that hinder output adjust-
ment, increasing inflationary pressures. In light of these
117M. Kandil / Borsa I_stanbul Review 14 (2014) 104e118constraints, the objectives of monetary policy should be geared
explicitly toward inflation targeting to stabilize inflationary
expectations and increase incentives for growth-inductive pri-
vate activity.Appendix A. Econometric methodology
The surprise terms that enter models (1) through (4) are
unobservable, necessitating the construction of empirical
proxies before estimation can take place. Thus, the empirical
models include equations that describe the process generating
the change in aggregate demand, government spending, the
money supply, and the exchange rate. The predictive values of
these equations are the proxies for agents’ expectations of the
change in these variables.
Obtaining the proxy for agents’ forecasts follows the results
of the endogeneity test suggested by Engle (1982). Given evi-
dence of endogeneity, variables in the forecast equations are
based on the results of a formal causality test. Hence, agents’
forecasts are approximated using two lags of the change in the
short-term interest rate and two lags of the change in the log-
value of real output, the price level, government spending, the
money supply, the exchange rate and the energy price. Structural
break dummies are introduced, as warranted, to account for
different policy regimes. As outlined in Borys, Horvath, and
Fanta (2009), it is difficult to estimate monetary shocks accu-
rately across different monetary regimes without appropriately
controlling for regime shifts using structural break dummies.
Surprises that enter the empirical models are then formed
by subtracting agents’ forecasts from the actual growth in each
variable. The positive and negative components of shocks are
defined for joint estimation, following the suggestions of
Cover (1992), as follows:
negst ¼1
2
fabsðDsstÞ Dsstg
posst ¼ 1
2
fabsðDsstÞ þDsstg s¼ d;g;m;h
where Ddst, Dgst, Dmst, and Dhst are the shocks to the change
in aggregate demand, government spending, the money sup-
ply, and the exchange rate. The terms negst and posst are the
negative and positive components of each shock.
In order to obtain efficient estimates and to ensure correct
inferences (i.e., to obtain consistent variance estimates), the
empirical models in (1) and (2) or (3) and (4) are estimated
jointly with the equations that determine proxy variables
following the suggestions in Pagan (1984, 1986) using 3SLS.
The instruments list for estimation includes two lags of the
change in the interest rate and two lags of the change in the log
value of real output, the price level, government spending, the
money supply, the exchange rate, and the energy price. The
paper’s evidence is robust with respect to variations in the
instruments list or the lag length.
The results of Engle’s (1982) test for serial correlation in
simultaneous-equation models are consistent with the presenceof a first-order autoregressive errors in some models. To cor-
rect for serial correlation, it is assumed that the error term
follows an AR(1) process. To filter out serial correlation, the
estimated model is transformed through the filter (1  rL)
where r is the estimate of the serial correlation parameter and
L is the lag operator such that LXt ¼ Xt1. The estimated re-
siduals from the transformed models have zero mean and are
serially independent.Appendix B. Data sources
1. Real Output: Gross domestic product, constant prices,
W914NGDPR, WEO.
2. Aggregate Demand: Gross domestic product, current pri-
ces, W914NGDP, WEO.
3. Price: Gross domestic product deflator, W914NGDPD,
WEO.
4. Government Spending: Public consumption expenditure,
current prices, W914NCG, WEO, or government con-
sumption, 61291F..ZF., IFTSTSUB.
5. Exchange Rate: National currency per U.S. dollar,
W914ENDA, WEO.
6. Monetary Base: Reserve money, W914FMB, WEO.
7. Consumption: Private consumption expenditure, current
prices, W311NFIP, WEO.
8. Investment: Gross private fixed capital formation, current
prices, W311NFIP, WEO.
9. Imports: Imports of goods and services, current prices,
W213NM, WEO.
10. Exports: Exports of goods and services, current prices,
W513NX, WEO.
11. Money: the sum of currency outside banks and private
sector demand deposits, 91434.ZF., IFTSTSUB.
12. Interest Rate: representatives of short-term interest rate.
Deposit rate, 21360L..ZF., IFTSTSUB. Lending rate,
21360P..ZF., IFTSTSUB.
13. The Energy Price: West Texas Intermediate Price.
All annual series are from World Economic Outlook or
International Financial Statistics, available on tape from the
International Monetary Fund.References
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